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Abstract 
 
Corporate governance is of primary importance in Private Banking. Since the client needs to 
ensure that the bank acts in his best interest, the choice of the banking institution to manage 
his wealth is primordial. In this paper, we argue that current business models in the wealth 
management industry show considerable discrepancies when it comes to corporate 
governance efficiency. Following a review of various governance mechanisms our results 
suggest that, some business models in the private banking industry are more efficient than 
others to align the interests of the bank with those of the clients. Eventually, a careful due 
diligence has to be undertaken before the client chooses its wealth management services 
provider regarding governance issue. We conclude that the best business model in private 
banking is dependent both on governance efficiency and on the client’s characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“I think more than anything we’re looking for someone we can trust, and the 
higher you go up the wealth scale the more that is the case”.  
 
This extract from the report The new world of wealth: Seven key trends for investing, giving 
and spending among the very rich, unveiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit reminds us 
that the mindset of wealthy individuals has dramatically changed over the past two years. 
Of course, being provided ‘above average returns’ are still high on their agenda. But 
following Lehman Brothers’ fall in 2008 and the impact of fraudulent advisors such as 
Bernard Madoff, looking for someone that can effectively and safely manage their 
investments became of primary importance. 
 
The private banking industry is a particular industry within the financial sector. Actually, it is 
one of the few that could experience growth in assets under management in times of 
financial turmoil. As such, this activity constitutes a strategic pillar for many banks. But being 
part of an apparently thriving industry does not necessarily mean that one cannot 
experience defection by clients. UBS, formerly the world leader in wealth management could 
not agree more.  
After experiencing trouble with the US tax authority regarding possible tax evasion by some 
of its clients in addition to difficulties with its investment banking arm, large sums under 
management flew out of the company towards what investors considered being safer places 
for their wealth. Other large players such as Credit Suisse and smaller private banks (like 
cantonal banks in Switzerland) were the main recipients. Other wealthy investors even chose 
to set up their own structure to manage their wealth while some turned to independent 
financial advisors, conscious that unbiased advice may be their best asset in times of 
turbulent markets. 
This suggests that while large and well-know financial institutions continue to lead the field 
in the wealth management industry, other structures also seem to be potential targets for 
wealthy individuals. Trust might be the key to explain investors’ catalyst when it comes to 
the choice of their wealth manager. 
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While the linkage between trust and private banking performance may be perceived as 
pretty straightforward because it can be measured (with the amount of new assets under 
management for instance), less obvious are the reasons that drove the client to push the 
door of a given institution.  Surely reputation, along with trust, is part of the winning 
equation for banks, but understanding the link between the client and his bank require to go 
beyond the boundaries of quantifiable facts. 
Subsequent to our extensive research in this field in order to seek the ‘missing link’ that 
bound the client to the bank, corporate governance appears to be a promising field of study. 
Although rarely used in this industry to define the client/bank relationship, studying the 
impact of Corporate Governance Efficiency (CGE), i.e. the alignment of the client’s interests 
with those of the wealth manager, on both parties can reveal interesting outcomes. 
The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the four more common business models 
currently in use in the wealth management industry. By focusing on Corporate Governance 
Efficiency, this research describes and analyses the corporate governance mechanisms that 
link the client to the bank with the aim to unveil a potential ultimate business model in 
private banking. 
This research is organized as follows: After a brief description of the wealth management 
landscape, we go through a description of the models that will be analyzed in the 
subsequent section. The third section consists of the description of the foundations of 
private banking business model: corporate governance efficiency. Then, we discuss the 
comparative advantages and drawbacks of each model through a literature review. The 
following section deals with the analysis of our finding through the prism of corporate 
governance. The closing section summarizes this research results and provides 
recommendations for clients as well as financial organizations.  
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2. The wealth management landscape 
 
Before focusing on the core subject of this research, i.e. corporate governance as a link 
between the bank and its client, it is worthwhile to provide a broader picture of the wealth 
management industry. This brief private banking landscape description is valuable to bear in 
mind for the analysis part and the recommendation parts of this research. 
 
2.1 What is private banking?  
The literature provides several definitions for the phrase ’private banking’. Broadly speaking, 
we can define private banking as business in which wealthy individuals are offered bespoke 
investments solutions, advisory and other services to serve their needs and desire on a long-
term scale. [Others definitions can be found in (Driga, Nita, et al. 2009); (Molineux and  
Omarini, 2005)]. More precisely, Balmer and Stotvig (1997), point out that originally, the 
expression private banking “refers to those banks which are owned by a group of partners 
who have unlimited liability.” 
From an historical viewpoint, private banking is not a recent business although many retail 
banks and investments banks have opened recently their own private banking arm. The 
private banking history seems to be closely embedded to the development of commerce 
between countries (Cettier and Schmitt, 2009). In the case of Wegelin and Co. for instance, 
the oldest Swiss private bank in the world, the development of international trade between 
neighboring countries required capabilities that only banks can offer in the eighteenth 
century: knowledge about foreign currencies as well as public investment issues. And once 
the wealth of merchants was made, they typically turn to the bank that offered them sound 
advice for their business (Cettier and Schmitt, 2009).  
Nowadays, the services provided may vary slightly from one bank to another. However, the 
variety of investments and services available in private banks typically range from classical 
investment solutions such as structured products and other non-investments solutions like 
art advisory services and property management (see appendix III)  
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2.2 The “Swiss myth” 
Located in the heart of Europe, Switzerland appears to be one of the global benchmarks 
when it comes to wealth management.  
With a long standing tradition in wealth management of over 300 years, secrecy and strong 
reputation, especially abroad, Switzerland has traditionally led the field in private banking 
(Geiger and Hürzeler, 2003).  The international private banking study published by the Swiss 
Banking institute and the University of Zurich, reveals that the most profitable banking 
institutions can currently be found in Liechtenstein and Switzerland, despite their apparent 
weaknesses such as the personnel costs per employee due to the high standard of living in 
those countries (see appendix IV). In clients’ mind, the bank and the country of origin is 
clearly associated (Balmer and Stotvig, 1997).  
This may explain why Switzerland saw a massive inflow of new assets during the past two 
years. But other elements could also explain the leadership of this country in this industry. 
Economic and political stability, tax advantages, legal considerations and quality of life 
seems to be quite appealing to wealthy individuals according to Scorpio Partnership, one of 
the leading consulting companies specializing in the wealth management industry.  
 
2.3 The client and the relationship manager 
In private banking, the word ‘client’ is commonly preferred to ‘customer’ due to the nature 
of business as underlined by Balmer and Stotvig (1997). Actually, this word appears to be 
misleading since in private banking there is not really ‘a client’ but several clients with 
distinctive goals and needs.  Usually, private banks use the wealth and/or income of 
prospective individuals to segment them into 4 categories, ranging from the so-called 
affluent segment with around $250,000 of investable assets (so not including house or boat 
for instance) to Ultra-High-Net-Worth with more than $50 million to invest according to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and its 2005 wealth management survey (see exhibit 1).  
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Exhibit1 : The wealth management pyramid. 
 
Source: Adapted from PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Private Banking/wealth management survey 2005, p.10  
 
The threshold to become a client varies dramatically from one bank to another but usually, a 
minimum of $1 million of investable assets is required in order to gain access to tailor made 
investment solutions in private banks as a rule of thumb although some banks may require 
substantially less. For example, £250,000 is required at Barclays Wealth Management to 
open an account and even £15,000 at Coutts & co. will be enough to benefit from the whole 
range of services offered by the private bank (Balmer and Stotvig, 1997). 
Typical clients in private banking encompass various profiles with different needs. Examples 
include entrepreneurs, inheritors, sports star, actors and executives of large companies. 
Nevertheless, usual private banking services users seem to posses five core common 
characteristics regardless of their source of income. As such, distinctive common features 
are: a desire for control; complex financial and familial affairs, an extensive personal and 
professional network; the ability to deploy their capital effectively and philanthropic 
inclinations (Grove, 2007).  
In order to deliver the client the best service/cost ratio, the wealth management 
organization needs to distinguish valuable clients from the others. To solve this question, 
many banks are applying a simple rule of thumb, as emphasized by Foehn (2004) : “keep 
those clients who consistently generate a lot of sales and lose those who occasionally 
perform a few transactions with the bank.” Although useful in most cases for the 
management, a relationship manager can arguably provide a better fine tuning in this rule by 
UHNW
>$50 million
Very High Net 
Worth $5m-$50 m
High Net worth 
$500,000-$5 million
Affluent  
$100,000-$500,000
19 %
32 %
30 %
19 %
Percentage of asset under management 
per category
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for instance incorporating essential notions such as referrals potentials. As a cornerstone of 
the bank, the relationship manager represents for most clients the ‘true face’ of the bank.  
Sometimes compared to an ‘orchestral leader’ according to the metaphor used by Tieman 
(2007), his role is to be the matrix between the client’s needs and the bank offering. Working 
for wealthy individuals and successful individual can be stimulating especially if they have 
global needs because it pushes him to be at the cutting edge of the industry. Still, the 
workload could be consequent when dealing with High-Net-Worth individuals (HNWI) and 
Ultra-High-Net-Worth individuals (UHNWI). Demanding, they can call the relationship 
manager 24/7; in some cases “about anything from a stolen wallet to latest trend in the 
currency market, or what happened overnight on Wall Street. Sometimes, they are just for a 
view on the economy, or to chew over some political development” (Tieman, 2007).  
Apart from being a counselor for the client, his duty is also to implement the strategy drawn 
up by his employer. This dual duty may sometimes be in conflict with one of the parties’ 
interest. We will investigate later in this paper the nature of this conflict as well as the 
possible way to prevent it. But for now on, let us consider the challenges that are arising in 
the private banking industry. 
 
2.4 Challenges in private banking 
The wealth management industry is unique in the banking landscape. Indeed, the research 
entitled World Wealth Report 2009 conducted by Cap Gemini and Merrill Lynch, underline 
that this activity had significantly outperformed the other traditional banking activities in 
terms of revenues despite the financial turmoil of 2008.  
Nevertheless, this industry is still subject to cyclical fluctuations and bank earnings and 
profitability are strongly embedded in the wealth fluctuations of the clients (Molineux and 
Omarini, 2005). During the period 1979-1994, most private banks experienced an impressive 
annual growth of roughly 15 per cent (Kay, 1994) and around 10 per cent growth per year 
during the period 2003 to 2007 according to the consulting firm McKinsey.  
According to the McKinsey European Private Banking Survey of 2009, private banking 
remains a highly attractive business because of three distinctive features: an attractive 
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growth rate over-time, a limited capital requirement and last but not least, the significant 
excess of liquidity it generates. Several retail banks throughout Europe, such as Lloyds in the 
UK, have acquired or set up their own private banking structure, in order to benefit from 
those features (Balmer and Stotvig, 1997). As a consequence, the private banking market 
nowadays highly fragmented where even UBS, one of the largest players in the industry has 
a 4.2% market share (Birchler, Cocca and Ettlin, 2009).  
It is worthwhile to mention that the bottom line of the business is that it is design for growth 
because in wealth management, one of the key criteria to assess the health of an institution 
is to look at the assets under management. With high cost base structure due to the high 
degree of contact implied by the inner nature of the business (Birchler et al. 2009) in 
addition to decreasing margin following the intensification of the competition in the 
industry, the private banking landscape might change dramatically in the future. Mergers 
and acquisitions may rise as expected by Birchler et al. (2009).  
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3. Research methodology 
 
3.1 Main contribution 
On the one hand, an increasing number of private banks have, over the last decade, 
gathered data on a voluntary basis in order to better understand the industry and because 
they are useful benchmarks to compare your business with those of the competitors. On the 
other side this is a field that is rarely academically analyzed (Cocca, 2007), partly because it 
has traditionally been in the shadow of other banking activities such as investment banking 
or retail banking.  
Hence, to date it seems that little research had been undertaken in that area, particularly 
regarding the study of current private banking models. As a consequence, this research aims 
at closing this gap by offering a research study that is both scientifically grounded and 
relevant for practitioner. Thus, this research can provide valuable insight to wealthy 
individuals, in order to choose the most appropriate wealth manager according to their 
situation. For practitioners, this paper can enhance their efficiency by identifying key 
elements that could attract and retain affluent investors. 
 
3.2 Problem statement 
The research purpose is to find out why and under which condition(s) one of the main 
business models currently used in Private Banking may emerge as better than the others 
with a specific focus on Corporate Governance Efficiency (CGE). 
In other words, the aim is to find out which one of the four business models can efficiently 
align the interests of the clients with those of the organization managing his wealth. 
Since the problem statement is theory driven, we organize the literature findings to try to 
find if theoretically an ‘ideal’ private banking model seems to emerge. Then, we intend to 
compare these findings with ‘real-life’ examples before describing a tentative ‘ultimate’ 
model that could be implemented taking into account theoretical findings as well as real 
business consideration such as cost, feasibility and obviously corporate governance 
implications. 
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The link between the bank and the client is not as straightforward as it seems. Actually, on 
one hand, the client needs first to assess his needs while comparing them with the 
organization product and service range. On the other hand, the bank needs to make sure 
that the budget devoted to this client is optimal (in terms of time, product range, etc.) in 
order to balance the trade-off between large offering and the cost constraint that it implies. 
The bottom line is that a bank needs to devote its time and money only to the extent that 
the client will be satisfied and not beyond. The alignment of interests between the bank and 
the client may not be optimal and it is to better understand what causes this misalignment 
of objective that we have undertaken the following research. 
 
3.3 Data collection  
The following paper is based on a deductive approach i.e. derived from theory to data with 
the aim to generalize the findings.  
Conducting our own report based on practitioners and client interviews would have been a 
thrilling experience. Unfortunately, due to the secretive nature of this industry, given our 
position, and the time constraint, conducting such data collection is an option that was 
unrealistic. The probability of getting biased or unreasonable answers and the reluctance of 
bank managers and relationship managers to talk about strategic issues was foreseeable. As 
a consequence, we choose to rely on data already available. Far away from being a burden, 
this choice offers several advantages. Those data are unobtrusive, which is particularly 
important when dealing with sensitive issue (Cowton, 1998), namely money in our case. In 
addition, they are undoubtedly of higher quality than data we could collect on our own and 
unforeseen discoveries might be expected (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009).  
 
3.4 Research design 
Both primary and secondary data were used in the process. Regarding primary data, reports, 
surveys and research papers they were gathered while secondary data were collected in 
books, journals and refereed academic journals. We also have been granted the access to a 
recent case study (and one of the few available in the field of private banking) written by 
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Bernd Schmitt and Patrick Cettier from Columbia Business School. These various sources 
were very important during the analysis because it allowed me to double check the 
information provided. In case of contradictions between papers apparently using the same 
samples of data, the choice has been made to prefer research papers and refereed academic 
journal over other sources in order to enhance the relevance of this research. 
In the analysis part, we use both qualitative and quantitative data from the selected 
literature. The benefit is that crossing both methods provides a better paper. 
To facilitate the reading of this thesis for people not familiar with private banking 
terminology, a glossary is provided in appendix I. Besides, for each private bank’s name that 
appears in this paper, appendix II provides the pages and examples as an illustration.  
 
3.5 Limitations of the study 
It is important to mention that they are other models such as life insurance companies and 
mutual fund companies that might have been included in this research since they are also 
targeting the same clients. However, due to time constraint and lack of relevant data, we 
choose to focus exclusively on four business models, namely Independent Advisor; 
Integrated Private Bank; Pure Player and Family Office.  
Furthermore, some of the models identified are widely spread around the globe (integrated 
banks for instance) while some would be country-specific (especially small ‘pure players’, a 
Swiss specialty). In this thesis, we focus primarily on the European market and more 
precisely Western-European markets such as Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and 
the UK. Due to the long-standing tradition of excellence and reputation of Switzerland in this 
industry, a particular focus will be given to the model of banks from Switzerland. As a 
consequence the analysis provided as well as the recommendation may not be applicable in 
other countries, especially in emerging countries. 
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4. Model description 
 
In order to narrow down our research, we have analyzed the four main business models 
available in private banking according to their value propositions.  
4.1 The independent financial advisor 
Sometimes called ‘asset manager’ or ‘financial advisor’, an independent financial advisor can 
be defined as a person, or a very small team that provides financial recommendations for a 
client.  
This structure is based on the idea of the ‘pay as you go’ system: when a client needs some 
advice on a particular investment opportunity, the independent financial advisor will provide 
the service in exchange for a commission; or on a fixed fee basis if the client requires a more 
holistic approach.  
In addition, since they are basically too small to construct proprietary investment product, 
the advisor will select, in line with its recommendation a series of state-of-the-art 
investment products or services from larger private banks and sell it to the client in exchange 
for a fee. Hence, with this so-called ‘brokerage system’, the financial advisor will earn money 
on the basis of the number of transactions made.  
There is apparently no specific threshold to set up this kind of structure although it is usually 
required in many countries to hold a specific license to be able to practice as a financial 
advisor. In addition, this kind of structure seems to be designed to cope with a large scope of 
customers that range from affluent investors to High-Net-Worth individuals. 
 
4.2 Integrated banks 
 Sometimes refereed as ‘hybrid’ structure or ‘universal bank’, integrated bank is the 
structure that has been adopted by large banking organizations such as UBS, HSBC or 
Goldman Sachs to name but a few. Moreover, according to a joint study undertaken by 
KPMG and Universität St.Gallen in Switzerland, their value proposition is not solely based on 
secrecy but rather on cross-selling opportunities between the arms of the bank. Accordingly, 
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the international management consulting firm Oliver Wyman, points out that “these 
institutions derive the lion’s share of revenues from a combination of wealth services and 
investment banking. Some players in this group are also active in retail banking, but normally 
are confined to their home market. This model rests on the view that significant synergies 
can be extracted from a well orchestrated coordination of these lines of business”. Integrated 
banks deal with the entire range of client that goes from affluent until UHNWI but tend to 
focus on clients with at least $1 million of investable assets. 
 
4.3 Pure-players 
As underlined by the KPMG/Universität St. Gallen Study, “client orientation and centricity “is 
of primary importance for those banks. Besides, “they also rely on discretion and secrecy 
advantages coupled with a solid brand reputation and stability. They also believe that 
providing ‘independent’ advisory to their clients is important and are prone to expand “open 
architecture’ offering” i.e. the use of third party investment solution. Put differently, the 
alignment of interests between the client and the bank is seen as their priority over short 
term consideration.  
Pure players typically include private banks with Swiss origins. It is important to mention 
that, in Switzerland many banks can be seen as pure players but only a few are allowed to 
use the name ‘private banker’ since it is a protected term (see appendix V). Swiss private 
bankers can be defined by a fair degree of transparency and an entrepreneurial spirit that 
differentiate them from other private banks. This point can be illustrated by this quotation, 
extracted from the business case written by Cettier and Schmitt (2009). It describes the 
particularity of Swiss private bank since “Wegelin, unlike Wall Street bank, is still privately 
owned. With unlimited personal liability, the interests of each of the managing partners are 
aligned: they participate fully in the upside as well as the downside. The bank thus focuses 
mostly on asset and wealth management, has a limited credit portfolio, a conservative 
balance sheet, and no investment banking activities. Proprietary trading is highly restricted 
and used primarily to test new investment strategies with the bank’s own money before 
offering them to clients.” 
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Pure players usually target the ‘top of the pyramid’ of wealth with a clientele mainly build up 
with high net worth and ultra high net worth individuals. Examples of pure players include 
Pictet & Cie, EFG international, or Lombard Odier. 
 
4.4 Family office 
We should start by underlining the fact that there is not only one type of family office 
structure but at least two, namely Single Family Office (SFO) and Multi-Family Office (MFO). 
Simply put, a single family office is a structure set up by one family to manage the financial 
and fiscal matters of the family while a multi-family office gathers several unrelated families 
with the purpose of managing in common their wealth. Since in this study we will focus 
primarily on single family office, it is worthwhile to get working knowledge of this structure.  
For Amit, Liechtenstein et al. (2008), “single family offices are professional organization 
dedicated to managing the personal fortunes and lives of very wealthy families. […]their 
charge was-and still is-to protect their particular family’s investments and assets for both 
current and subsequent generations. Since the beginning, affluent families have been 
attracted to SFOs, rather than to commercial banks, investment companies or other wealth 
optimization services, because of their promise of exclusivity, privacy and customization.” 
Broadly speaking, family offices have a very large spectrum of functions although 4 primary 
functions are the common feature of most family office (see exhibit 2). 
 
Exhibit 2: The 4 primary functions of family offices 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McCann & Lavayssière, (2008), Wealth, How the World’s high-net-worth growth, sustain and manage their fortunes.p.112 
1. Centralization of records : all financial statements, bill paying, tax planning; 
 
2. Business management: purchase and sale of business holdings, distribution of financial 
information, administration of tangible assets such as real estates and yachts; 
 
3. Family management: family governance, education, philanthropy, wealth transfer 
planning; 
 
4. Investment related functions: investment policy setting, asset allocation, monitoring. 
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Hence, a family office significantly differs from traditional private banking product offering 
by being significantly more holistic to cover all the matters related to the daily life of wealthy 
individuals (see appendix VI). Such structures typically focus on Ultra-High-Net-Worth 
individuals and families and are quite costly to set up. As a consequence, only families with 
at least $20 million of investable assets might consider this type of organization while 
Pompian (2009), believes that any family with over $50 million should understand the 
benefits of this model. 
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5. A general framework on Corporate Governance Efficiency (CGE) 
 
Trust. It is nowadays the key element in private banking. But trust is only a word we use to 
describe the psychological mechanism that links the client to the bank or his relationship 
manager. To fully understand the linkage between those two parties, we need to go deeper 
into the motives of both parties that push them to enter into contract.  
For the bank, its motive is to attract the assets of wealthy individuals and provide advice, 
products and services for a fee. For the client, the purpose is to find the best possible 
provider in order to manage and hopefully sustain and growth the current wealth. Those 
goals do not seem conflicting but when one adds a third party in this relationship, namely 
the relationship manager that works for the bank, the outcome might be slightly different. 
The alignment of interests of each may not be optimal because each party knowing that his 
interest is at stake might show a different behaviour. 
The following section provides the reader with the necessary background to fully appreciate 
the scope of corporate governance issues within the private banking context.  
 
5.1 Goal Misalignment 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide a thorough overview of this issue in their research paper 
called Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. For 
them, the whole issue can be summarized as follow: 
“An agency relationship [is] a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good 
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs 
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some 
situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to 
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guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal 
or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such 
actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at 
zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the 
principal’s viewpoint”.  
In the context of private banking, the purpose is obviously to ensure that the private bank, 
i.e. the agent, will act in the principal’s best interest, i.e. the client. As pointed out by Peng 
(2009), the main reason for this possible conflict of interest is mainly due to information 
asymmetries. This is particularly relevant in the wealth management industry because, as 
underlined by Akerlof (1970), such issues arise when the client knows less about products 
and services than the provider. The question is then to find a commitment device that can 
be powerful enough to reduce this information asymmetry and ultimately realign all the 
parties’ interests. This is what we mean by corporate governance efficiency. 
 
5.2 Contracting as a governance mechanism 
The formation of a proper contract between the client and the wealth management firm 
that will clearly define the rights and obligations of both parties may be promising. 
Nevertheless, the terms of this contract can be impeded by the intervention of a third party -
the relationship manager- because of his role that can be ambiguous. On one side, he is 
committed to the bank that provides his income and consequently should follow its strategy. 
On the other side, he cares about providing the client with the best advice possible 
regardless of the bank prerogatives.  
A possible solution to this situation may be to draw a long-term incentive contract between 
the bank and the relationship manager. Provided that this contract also matches the  client’s 
interests, the interests of each of the three parties could be realigned (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
Besides, still according to Sheleifer and Vishny (1997) this contract “can take a variety of 
forms, including share ownership, stock options, or a threat of dismissal if income is low.” But 
monetary incentives may not be the optimal incentives when it comes to the realignment of 
stakeholders.  
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5.3 Corporate culture and share value 
Corporate culture is an interesting concept to analyze here. Powerful links that can tie the 
employee to the bank, corporate culture may also be a promising tool to align the interest of 
the employee with those of the bank. If value sharing is also added to the equation, the 
alignment of interests may be very strong between the client, the relationship manager and 
the bank.  
A possible caveat with monetary incentives such as above average wages, stock options and 
equity stakes is that people tend to “respond too well” to them (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). 
Even worse is that fact that companies would only “get what they pay for” according to 
Gibbons (1998).  
In Identity and the Economics of Organizations, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) show how an 
organization can change individual’s preferences regarding pecuniary considerations by 
providing the example of new recruits at West Point, the U.S. Army School, for future army 
officers. With this well documented example, they show that this organization, that is not 
necessarily attractive for its salary, can be perceived as extremely eye-catching once the 
program is over due to a newly common value that bound the new officers to the US army. 
From a bank viewpoint, this example might have its appeal.  
Actually, several private banks set up their own programs (Barclays Wealth, Credit Suisse or 
RBC Wealth to name but a few) for new recruits that come to work in the bank straight out 
of university. And in many ways, this training program can be seen as similar to the West 
point one: with duration from 18 months to 3 years, those programs aim at providing both 
the technical and soft skills necessary to perform efficiently in their new environment. 
However, such programs target usually only newcomers in the wealth management industry 
and very seldom latecomers. In this last case, it seems extremely important for the bank to 
scout and take on professionals that already share common values with them.  
Prendergast (2007) believes that the recruitment of workers that share common values with 
the organization can significantly enhance its efficiency. In addition, for Brekke and Nyborg 
(2008), this selective recruitment through a careful selection may also be seen as a strategic 
leverage for the firm.  By recruiting the best element that fits the organization values, banks 
may experience significant efficiency improvement due to the fact that those employees 
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would take on increased responsibilities. Ultimately, this may considerably benefit to the 
company while the others may be driven out of the market. 
For Grant (2008), common culture and value sharing constitute the backbone that may lead 
to solving cooperation and coordination issues. But reputation can also be a powerful 
leverage. 
 
5.4 The alignment of interests through reputation  
In private banking, reputation is important. From a theoretical standpoint, “reputation-
building as a very common explanation for why people deliver on their agreements even if 
they cannot be forced to” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Private Banks provide advice as well as 
products and/or services. In return, the client rewards the bank for its involvement through 
the form of a fee. Let us now consider the following example.  
Because of its current strategy, that favors a particular product over another, the bank 
would be reluctant to recommend this last investment opportunity that perfectly matched 
its client’s needs because on the short run, it would imply lower earnings for the bank. Then, 
the issue would be to find a way to realign both the interest of the bank with those of the 
client. The answer would undoubtedly be ‘assets under management’. 
Private Banks are dependents on their amount of assets under management since without it, 
they would simply not exist. The bank needs to attract those assets by various strategies: 
acquiring new clients, demonstrating consistent over-performance or repatriating assets of 
existing clients currently in others wealth management firms to the bank (Bachmann and 
Hens 2008).  
Reputation appears to be a potent leverage regardless of the strategy implemented in order 
to sustain and increase those assets under management. It can not only comfort the client 
that his assets are in safe hands, but also discourage the bank to drive away from its clients 
best’s interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, as pointed out by Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989), reputation is not flawless. As a consequence, sometimes breaking the moral contract 
that bound the bank and client may be more efficient for one of the party than completing 
| 24 
 
it. In such a case, legal protection may be the only way to ensure that both parties will truly 
complete their respective obligations. 
 
5.5 Legal protection 
As underlined previously, in some special circumstance, it might be rational for one of the 
party to deliberately default from its obligation instead of fulfilling its duty (Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989). Legal enforcement is in this case the only tool, besides arbitration, that could 
force the faulty party to realign his interests with the other party. 
Most of the activities undertaken by the bank on the client are made through contracting 
and thus allow any party to enforce their rights before the courts in case of violation. This is 
particularly relevant for ‘private bankers’ in Switzerland. Because they have unlimited 
liability on their professional as well as personal belongings, the legal protection that bounds 
the client to the bank seems to be extremely strong. Besides, since they usually invest along 
the client, the alignment of interest, i.e. corporate governance efficiency, is obvious. 
Whatever the organization ultimately chosen by the investor, establishing a clear contract 
that is binding and enforceable for both parties may be the key to an optimal governance 
system (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
5.6 Establishing the link between CGE and private banking  
Typically, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), in A survey of Corporate Governance, a 
“good corporate governance system should combine some type of large investors with legal 
protection of both their rights and those of small investors.” 
So, in order to align the interests of every party, the optimal corporate governance system 
could include the following elements. (1) Long term incentives contract that matches the 
objectives of the relationship managers with those of the bank, in line with the client’s 
needs. (2) The recruitment of relationship managers that fits the corporate value of the bank 
can seriously constitute a competitive advantage over other financial institutions. As such, 
this should be carefully planned. (3) Strong reputation appears to be a notorious 
| 25 
 
commitment device for the bank, capable to impede any willingness to deviate from the 
client’s best interests. And (4) a contract that clearly defines the rights and obligation of each 
party. The prospect of retaliation in case of default has to be high enough to ensure a total 
compliance with the terms agreed.  
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6. Literature review on corporate governance 
 
Every private bank aims at providing the whole spectrum of wealth management services 
from the distribution to the reporting (see exhibit 3). This concern has two purposes. As a 
private bank, one wants to make sure that the client receives truly integrated advice and by 
being able to deliver this customer centric added value without the help of outside parties 
may be perceived as a clear strength (Geiger and Hürzeler, 2003). On the other side, it is the 
best way to ensure that your institution will extract increasing revenues through rising 
number of transactions.  
This view has been challenged in the last 10 years, when large private banks like Credit 
Suisse, started to outsource to third party some of their product and services. They claimed 
that is was the best way to provide state-of-the-art wealth management services by making 
sure the client would be provided bespoke private banking services,  all along the value chain 
(Geiger and Hürzeler, 2003).  
 
Exhibit 3: The value chain in private banking
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Geiger and Hürzeler (2003), The transformation of the Swiss Private Banking Market, p. 8 
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An increasing number of private banks understood the advantage of offering third party 
investment solutions along their own products and services. As a consequence, nowadays, 
regardless of the business model chosen, banks offer pretty much the same ‘tailor made 
services’. 
As a consequence, differentiation is becoming a major concern in this industry because 
clients have increasing difficulties to distinguish one bank from another when it comes to the 
actual services provided. Lassar, Manolis, et al. (2000), demonstrated that in the case of 
private banking- that is a high contact service- “when the technical or core element of the 
service (what is actually delivered) is fairly stable, and level of service failure are low, the 
customer is able to devote more attention to how the service is delivered”. Hence clients 
would pay more attention to the ‘functional quality’, i.e. how the service is provided, rather 
than on ‘technical quality’ i.e. what is provided. 
 Corporate governance efficiency especially emphasizes on functional quality. Long term 
incentives, reputation, corporate values and legal protection might be combined in order to 
align client and bank’s interests. Studying comparatively each model with a special focus on 
CGE could be the key that leads to a better understanding each model value proposal. 
 
6.1 Reputation and corporate values: strengths and weaknesses of each 
business model 
As underlined previously, reputation and corporate values are strong governance 
mechanisms. Efficiently integrated within the business model, they constitute a great 
advantage to your organization. As a consequence, let us now focus on a comparative study 
on each business model with a particular focus on reputation and corporate values. 
With a long standing history in private banking, pure players -especially the ones that 
originate from Switzerland- seem to offer a particularly strong case when it comes to 
reputation. Pure players benefit from a strong image in potential clients’ mind that can add 
to their appeal.  
Reputation takes time to build and a blink is sufficient to lose it (Herbig and Milewicz, 1995). 
Besides, it is strongly correlated to sales performance (Shapiro, 1982). As a consequence, 
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pure players have a lot of incentives to perform well to maintain this outstanding reputation 
of privacy, security and customized services (Balmer and Stotvig, 1997).  Corporate values 
and reputation are closely embedded in this model thanks to the training offered in several 
banks (Julius Bär and Pictet & Cie for instance) to new recruits.  
Moreover, let us recall that this business model is mostly built on private banking activities 
and do not get income from other traditional banking activities such as retail banking or 
corporate investment banking. As a consequence, we can arguably say there is very little 
incentive for pure players to deviate from their clients’ best interest because reputation 
along with corporate values is the best catalyst for their image and subsequently their 
income.  
The same reasoning could be applied for independent advisors regarding reputation. Of 
course, they use a ‘brokerage system’ in which the client pays for each transaction or advice 
provided. So, it may be quite tempting for them to, sometimes, not act in the long term 
client best interest by providing recommendations that on the short term can increase their 
earnings. But here is the caveat. By doing so, especially if the client is also followed by 
another bank, the risk of damaging the reputation of the organization appears to be fairly 
high compared to short term benefit because of potential negative words of mouth.  
Richins (1983), showed that the impact of negative feedback from dissatisfied clients have a 
significant impact on purchase and repurchase decisions. In addition, as underlined by File & 
Prince (1994), the absence of negative comments is one of the main criteria used by clients 
to select their wealth management service provider. Thus, in a long term perspective, it is in 
the best interest of the independent advisor to provide sound advice regardless of short 
term considerations. So reputation is a strong commitment device for the independent 
advisor. Regarding corporate values in relation to that model, we did not find any relevant 
evidence that could impact the client/advisor relation. 
The integrated bank business model differs significantly from pure players. By using this 
model, private banks hope to extract some synergies between the different arms of the 
bank. In its report The future of private banking: A wealth of Opportunity, the consulting 
company Oliver Wyman revealed that, the private banking division of the bank can benefit 
from client referrals originating from both the investment banking and the retail banking 
| 29 
 
arms (see exhibit 4). Using the same idea, the margin on structured product can me ‘kept in 
house’ using the using the private bank “as a distribution platform for the group’s 
investment banking and asset management products”. 
 
Exhibit 4: Integrated business model and synergies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2008), The future of private banking: A wealth of opportunity? P.26 
 
Empirical evidence, in the literature, that supports benefits for private banks using this 
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As a consequence, provided that the private banking arm is aware of the potential caveats of 
this model, substantial positive effects can also be extracted to the benefit of the bank 
overall performance (Cocca, 2007). Nevertheless, almost every large integrated private bank 
suffers from the same criticism in the minds of wealthy investors: to be ‘product-pusher’. 
Because large banks tend to provide advice as well as product and service distribution, a 
conflict of interest between the bank and the client may arise. The bank may try to sell 
proprietary products that could provide higher margin even though they do not entirely 
match client’s needs. But most integrated banks are aware of this potential conflict of 
interest. That is why, the use of open-architecture i.e. including third party products and 
services, is on the rise (Geiger and Hürzeler, 2003).  
Sensitive to this potential conflict of interest that could impede the private bank’s 
willingness to provide an unbiased service, an increasing number of wealthy individuals are 
considering family offices as an interesting structure to manage their wealth (Avery, 2009). 
State-of-the-art products and services as well as independent advice have their appeal in 
times of uncertain transparency. 
By setting up their own family office - the so-called Single Family Office (SFO) - or by 
gathering several families to create a Multi-Family Office (MFO), affluent individuals are 
seeking several benefits (see exhibit 5).  
 
Exhibit 5: Benefits of setting up a single family office in Europe. 
 
Source: Amit et al. (2008) Single family office: private wealth management in the family context, p.12 
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Some are similar to what the previous business model can offer, that is wealth management 
of family’s assets, access to sophisticated investments (like hedge funds) and estate 
planning. Other offerings are more specific to this business model and examples include 
family governance, philanthropy and family member’s education (Amit et al. 2008). 
In the last 10 years, creating a family office has been seen as extremely trendy (Fazzi, 2010). 
But when it comes to corporate governance considerations, does this business model really 
stand out from the crowd? 
Reputation cannot really be discussed here given the secretive nature of this structure and 
the subsequent lack of relevant data. However, underlining corporate values as governance 
mechanism is worthwhile. Amit et al. (2008) found, by studying a large sample of family 
offices on a global basis, that governance mechanism to ensure that the family wealth is well 
and timely managed is particularly efficient. (1) Accountability of the professional that works 
in those organizations along with (2) objectivity in investment recommendations in addition 
to (3) an internal or external supervision board are the main reason brought up in their 
study.  
Although the board composition to ensure that the needs of the family are met varies 
greatly from one family office to the other, the level of wealth under management “does not 
affect the governance structure” (Amit et al.2008). 
 
Exhibit 6: Type of Single Family Office governance in Europe 
 
Source: Amit et al. (2008), Single family office: private wealth management in the family context, p.21 
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Since the governance mechanism in family offices is robust to varying wealth levels, this 
model seems to be particularly efficient to align the interests of the family with those of the 
professional working for them. 
 
6.2 Long term incentive contracts and legal protection: the business model 
propositions compared 
 
The private banking business is subject to an increasing level of scrutiny from regulators like 
any other banking and finance related activity. Nevertheless, family offices are “subject to 
minimal regulation” as pointed out by Leleux, Schwassat al. (2007). Despite the fact that 
they manage private wealth, like any other of the three models depicted previously, setting 
up a family office is a private matter and as such, regulations applicable to banks, insurance 
companies and pension funds to name but a few are not applicable to this structure (Leleux 
et al. 2007). 
This lack of regulation, at odd with the usual practices in this industry, does not seem to be a 
hurdle when it comes to corporate governance. Surprisingly, frequent communications and 
entrepreneurial incentive schemes between the professionals running on a daily basis the 
family office can efficiently supplement and even surpass this apparent weakness of weak 
legal protection for the family (Amit and Liechtenstein, 2009).  
Regarding communications, Amit and Liechtenstein (2009) found out that when managers 
and the family have weekly communication on investment results, a significant increase in 
the organization performance, in terms of annual return of interest, can be experienced. This 
suggests that close communication between the agent, i.e. family office managers, and 
principal, i.e. the family members, can greatly improve the organization’s effectiveness. 
Moreover, incentives schemes carefully designed to attract and retain the SFO’s chief 
executive officer (C.I.O.) can significantly influence the organization’s performance. Even 
though the CIO’s background differs from one family office the other (see exhibit VII), family 
offices that combine several entrepreneurial incentive schemes significantly outperform 
SFOs using less than the average of 1.5 incentives scheme such as cash bonuses, profit 
sharing and co-investment opportunities (Amit and Liechtenstein, 2009).  
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Exhibit 7: Number of entrepreneurial incentive schemes and performance  
 
Source: Amit and Liechtenstein (2009), report Highlights for “Benchmarking the SFO: Identifying the 
Performance Drivers”, p.13 
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dimension.   
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Appending the designation ‘private banker’ after the name of the bank implies that the bank 
complies with the SPBA regulations (The conditions for banks to be allowed as a ‘private 
banker’ are summarized in the article 4 of the SPBA statutes; see appendix VIII). The 
unlimited liability of several managing partners constitutes the main element of those 
regulations.  This unlimited liability means that managing partners will share the upside and 
the downside of the banks’ performance.  
This particular status can increase client trust into this organization because in case of failure 
he will have a safety net. For managing partners with unlimited liability, this personal 
financial risk can be perceived as a strong commitment device to act in their best interests 
which is closely embedded with those of clients. As put by Konrad Hummler, one of the 
managing partners with unlimited liability at Wegelin & co., “fear for one’s existence can be 
very motivating.” (Cettier and Schmitt, 2009) 
The legal rights provided to clients by this status in addition to the pressure on managing 
partners’ shoulders appear to be a strong commitment device to align both parties’ interests 
on a long term perspective. But integrated banks do not operate under the unlimited 
partnership status. Thus, we may wonder how they can overcome this apparently weaker 
legal protection. 
Certainly, integrated private banks establish clear contracts between them and the client for 
every single investment operation undertaken that is binding for each party, but when it 
come to the alignment of interests, no evidence was found regarding the efficiency of this 
device. State underwriting on the other side can provide stronger legal protection. 
During the past 2 years, several integrated banks have seen their revenues plummeting, due 
to poor results in their investment banking arm. This situation led to increasing skepticism 
from clients using their retail banking as well as the private banking services. As a 
consequence, they experience a large drop in their share price since many of them are 
quoted on the stock market. To reassure their clients, some banks like Royal Bank of 
Scotland, undertook talks with the national government to benefit from state underwriting 
(Webster, Gilmore, et al. 2008).  
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According to the consulting company Booz & company and its survey Private Banking 
beyond the ‘perfect storm’, state underwriting can have a positive impact on the bank 
because it reassures clients on the bank future prospects. As a consequence, clients tend to 
be more inclined to keep and in some cases increase their assets within those banks, 
because state underwriting is perceived as a solid safety net in their mind. However, they 
revealed that “the sustainability of these asset shifts was questionable” because clients may 
shift those assets to other banks once their perception of the current economic climate 
improves.  
Thus, state underwriting of integrated banks may provide higher legal protection for clients. 
But this effect, far away from been sufficiently documented, does not offer the guarantee 
that it improves corporate governance effectiveness between the bank and the client. As a 
consequence, it appears that reputation and corporate values are the few commitment 
devices that a private bank using the integrated business model can use to align their 
interests with those of the clients. Can the same conclusion be applied to independent 
advisors? 
The business model of independent advisors differs significantly of the one offer by 
integrated banks although some characteristics are common. Considering comparable 
features, like integrated bank, independent advisors are issuing contracts as soon as an 
investment recommendation is provided or a product is sold. That is for them an efficient 
way to ensure the client understands the process as well as a legal requirement. In addition, 
it provides for both the agent and the principal an efficient protection in case of legal claim 
(Bachmann and Hens, 2008).  
Long term incentives contracts, which are the attributes of the others business model 
previously analyzed, do not apply here. Let us recall that independent advisors commonly 
use a brokerage model in which the client pays a fee for each transaction. By using this 
model, a major focus is given to frequent transactions with a broad base of clients at the 
expense of long term relationships. Under those assumptions, it is thorny to really identify 
how the independent advisors and the client can align their interest. But we should not 
forget that the activity of independent advisors is correlated with positive word of mouth. So 
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even though legal protection and long term incentive contracts are not the best devices to 
align both parties interest, reputation can surely play that role. 
To summarize our findings so far, it is important to keep in mind that each model possesses 
its own corporate governance mechanisms. Sometimes several mechanisms are combined 
while in other business models, only one device seems to be the best catalyst to align the 
interests of the agent with those of the principal. The following exhibit is the summary of the 
efficiency of each in comparison to each model. 
 
Exhibit 8: Corporate Governance Efficiency by business model 
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The task for any wealth management organization regardless of its business model is to 
convince the clients that they are the most appropriate structure so that financial 
recommendations, products and services offered perfectly match the client’s needs and 
preferences.  The Corporate Governance Efficiency, that can be translated in four main 
mechanisms in private banking, can provide an idea of which structure is the best regarding 
solely corporate governance considerations. Family offices and pure player business models 
| 37 
 
show constant strong incentives to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal 
meanwhile integrated bank and independent advisors appear to be weaker. 
It is tempting as of this point in the research to draw a conclusion on the best business 
model. However, it would be hasty and somewhat misleading to compare each model 
according to their value proposition compared to corporate governance efficiency, without 
considering the clients requirements to access to each business model. Facts such as the 
costs to access to each model, perceived efficiency and prestige are also to be considered.  
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7. Beyond corporate governance efficiency: a closer look at the 
client’s requirements. 
 
Our findings on each business model compared to governance efficiency are quite clear.  
Family office and pure player’s business models lead the field. However those results seems 
to be at odds with the conclusions drawn by Euromoney Magazine in its 2009 and 2010 
private banking surveys. 
7.1 The CGE findings challenged 
According to Euromoney, which ranks the best global private banks according to qualitative 
(from front office staff) and quantitative criteria (average AuM growth, net income…), 
between 2008 and 2010, out of the 20 best global private banks, 18 of them are integrated 
banks while 2 operate according to the pure player model namely Pictet & Cie and Julius Bär 
(see appendix IX). And the same observation holds for the best services for affluent investors 
compared to their level of wealth (see appendix X).  
Of course, none of the family offices and independent advisors depicted previously is 
featured in this ranking because of their relative insignificance in their assets under 
management as well as their lack of international footprint inherent to their model. But how 
can we explain the relative absence of pure players in this ranking? 
Schmid and Walter (2009) demonstrated that individual investors through the stock market, 
value pure players with a premium compared to integrated private banks. Consequently, it 
implies that when affluent individuals are looking for their potential future wealth manager, 
other elements than Corporate Governance Efficiency attract their attention. The prestige 
offered by being a client at a well-known private bank can be part of the equation.  Trust 
may also rank high in their agenda. For Murphy (2009), trust, especially after the turbulent 
past two years is of primary importance when private investors are looking for a banking 
institution to manage their wealth. From the bank’s perspective, client acquisition and 
retention is the main issue because their sustainability depends on it (Molineux and Omarini, 
2005).  So the main task for wealth management institutions is to provide the clear evidence 
that they provide a truly value added service that would go a long way towards improving 
the client’s confidence in their organization. 
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According to the Boston Consulting Group and its Global wealth report 2009, several 
measures can be implemented by private banks to stand out in the eyes of potential new 
clients. Those measures are summarized in exhibit 9 below. 
 
Exhibit 9: Five ways to attract and retain clients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: extracted from The Boston Consulting Group, (2009), Global Wealth report 2009, pp.27-28 
 
However, to implement those measures efficiently, the bank needs to know its clients. Let us 
recall that in private banking there is no one client but several clients with various needs and 
objectives. Although the behaviour of private banking clients is unpredictable (Dhar and 
Glazer, 2003), clients’ requirements on wealth management services are well-known. Simply 
put, the higher the wealth of the client, the higher the degree of personalization and the 
complexity of products are necessary to fulfill his expectations (see exhibit 10).  
While fulfilling the client expectation would go a long way towards improving the trust in the 
wealth management services provider, the wealth management firm should not forget that 
meeting clients’ needs is great as long as it does not come at the expense of the survival of 
Tailored services: More than ever, private banks need to understand their client and provide tailored advice. 
[…] Bank must ensure that they have the capabilities-and the capacity- to provide a meaningful level of 
customized service to their clients. They should consider paring down the client segments they serve rather 
than providing a thin level of service to multiple client segments. 
 
Expertise: Private Banks have seen their image tarnished by the crisis. […]But most investors still lack the 
time or the knowledge to manage their assets on their own. They want (and need) to delegate this task to 
an expert. Banks will be able to attract clients by demonstrating their expertise and capabilities in wealth 
management. 
 
Additional services: Private banking involves more than investment advice. A comprehensive offering 
includes financial planning, fiduciary services, and specialist services such as tax consulting. 
 
Products: Although most investors will continue to shy away from products that seem overly complex, […] 
they will eventually begin searching for sophisticated products that provide capital protection along with 
access to different kind of market. 
 
Prestige: Clients have lost faith in some of the biggest names in wealth management […] but provided that 
they can deliver the products and services that are relevant to clients in the post-crisis world, these banks 
will regain their prestige. 
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the firm on a long term scale. Put differently, the wealth management company should not 
devote more resources to the client (in terms of time, level of service, etc) than what is 
necessary to maintain a long term mutually beneficial relationship.  
Exhibit 10: The complexity and personalization of services by wealth level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cellent Communication (2001), Wealth management market: capturing the hearts and assets of mass 
affluent. p.9  
As a consequence, each wealth management firm according to its operating business model, 
needs to know which client is profitable and who is not, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Prince and Grove (2007) demonstrated by surveying more than 260 wealth 
management companies that by knowing who can be regarded as an ‘ideal client’ to your 
firm, the wealth management company can significantly improve its performance (see 
exhibit 11).  
Exhibit 11: The ‘ideal client’ for each business model 
AuM Private Bank Independent 
advisor-‘brokerage 
model’ 
Multi-Family office Total 
Under $1m 
 
0% 14.1% 0% 4.1% 
$1 million to $5 million 
 
32% 42.3% 0% 23.8% 
$5 million to $10 million 
 
25.8% 17.9% 18.1% 20.8% 
$10 million to $25 
million 
23.7% 14.1% 47.9% 29.4% 
Over $25 million 
 
18.6% 11.5% 34% 21.9% 
Source: Adapted from Prince and Grove (2007), A view from the Top, Private Wealth Magazine. 
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So ideally, Private Banks should target individuals with investable assets ranging from $1 
million to $10 million with the possibility to extend this target to client of greater wealth 
according to the banks resources. Independent advisors need to focus on clients with 
investable assets between $1 million and $10 million while multi-family offices need to 
consider clients with at least $10 million. For Balmer and Stotvig (1997), segmenting clients 
according to their wealth is a sensible decision. However, a better fine tuning can be 
achieved by segmenting them according to their behaviour along with their wealth because 
this improved segmentation may provide the bank with the best key to understand the 
clients’ aspirations (see Exhibit 12). 
 
Exhibit 12: The 4 categories of clients in private banking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Balmer and Stotvig (1997), Corporate identity and private banking: a review and a case study, p.15 
 
Obviously, pretenders shall be discouraged from using the company services while full 
members had to be pampered by the bank because their financial investments are more 
than sufficient to justify a close-and costly- relationship (Balmer and Stotvig, 1997). 
 
 
Full Members: those who have integrated all their financial assets into the bank, and are very wealthy. 
Full members allow all their financial needs to be handled by the bank. The relationship between the 
bank and the client is very close. These clients should be encouraged to see themselves as members 
of a club rather than just clients of a bank. 
Nominal Members: have substantial wealth, but do not use many of the services provided by the 
bank. Most nominal members use the bank for investment management services. 
Aspirational members: use a wide range of the bank’s services, but at the moment do not have a 
substantial amount to invest.  
Pretenders: have little wealth. They use many of the services provided. In many cases, these clients 
had been allowed to open an account with the bank for the wrong reasons. The main motivation for 
remaining with the bank might be the use of the cheque book and the bank’s name. 
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7.2 Concluding remarks 
Those findings provide an enhanced foundation in our quest of the best business model in 
private banking. By using these findings in addition to Corporate Governance Efficiency, we 
are able to provide some hints to the main question of this paper which is to unveil the best 
business model in private banking. 
Well, it is worthwhile to underline the fact that none of the business models seems to 
significantly emerge as the ‘ultimate model’ in private banking from a Corporate Governance 
Efficiency standpoint. This is due to the fact that while it is important when clients are 
assessing the potential wealth managers’ service provider, CGE may not be the first criteria 
they are using. This is important because it means that clients consider the alignment of 
interests between them and the bank to be less significant than criteria such as prestige and 
aspiration. For the bank, this would imply that clients may join them for reasons that are 
other than their intrinsic value proposition. This means that wealth management service 
providers need to carefully assess their potential clients before starting doing business 
otherwise, a fair degree of free-riding behaviour from clients with lower investable assets 
may be experienced. 
Even though an ideal model regarding pure corporate governance consideration does not 
emerge from our research, some hints appears to give us a clue to know which conditions 
may be required for each business model to be the most efficiently used by the principal and 
the agent.  
Independent advisors, due to their governance characteristics, may be wise not to target 
clients of higher wealth but rather clients with lower wealth i.e. the mass affluent category. 
This would allow them to exploit their brokerage model efficiently and client with lower 
wealth. Besides by targeting the bottom of the wealth pyramid, fierce competition with large 
private banks can be avoided.  
Integrated banks could target entrepreneurs because by using both the retail and/or 
investment banking arm along with the private banking services of the bank, they may 
benefit from their enlarged vision of the organization. Repetitive transactions can forge 
clients’ opinion on the objectivity of the private banking arm. If the bank manages to 
overcome potentially conflicting goals inherent to its organization, this relation can be highly 
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profitable. For pure players, their ability to target investors that share their value may be 
critical. Clients with higher wealth may be favored because they would pay more attention 
to the service quality than the service actually provided.  
Subject to minimal regulation, family offices have a lot to offer. From a CGE standpoint, this 
structure seems to constantly align its interests with those of the investors. As a 
consequence, this model may emerge as one of the most efficient. However, a substantial 
level wealth is required to set up and run this structure. That is why multi-family offices or 
family offices run by pure players appear to be promising solutions. If the investor is willing 
to deviate, to some extent, from the alignment of interest provided by single family offices 
to the benefit of lower services costs, those two structures can offer interesting trade-off. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The research objective of this thesis was, through a comparative study, to evaluate the 
Corporate Governance Efficiency (CGE) of four business models in private banking. By doing 
so, we intended to unveil under which condition(s) one model may emerge to be better than 
the others.  
8.1 Summary of findings 
Our results suggest that regarding corporate governance efficiency, business models 
currently used in the wealth management industry demonstrate varying level of efficiency. 
‘Pure players’ and ‘family offices’, due to their intrinsic characteristics, appear to lead the 
field when it comes to Corporate Governance Efficiency.  
‘Pure player’ business model does not suffer from any significant flaw and even performs 
quite well in each of the four mechanisms able to align the interests of the clients with those 
of the bank. Although not benefiting from strong legal protection due to the lack of 
regulation, ‘Family offices’ appear to overcome this apparent weakness by performing 
extremely well with the other governance mechanisms, namely long-term incentive 
contracts and corporate values. 
Nevertheless, this result seems to be at odds with the current clients’ preferences when 
choosing their wealth management services provider. The current largest global wealth 
managers -in terms of assets under management- operate under the integrated banks 
business model. This result suggests that when clients are looking for an organization to 
manage their wealth, little importance is attached to Corporate Governance Efficiency. It 
means that clients set aside the alignment of their own interests with those of the 
organization managing their wealth to focus on other criteria.  
Surprisingly, this behaviour appears to be rational. By using criteria such as the minimum 
threshold to access each business model, word-of-mouth and apparent prestige to select 
their wealth manager, wealthy individuals are assessing those organizations with the only 
criteria they have at their disposal in an industry where secrecy and consequently objective 
information is scarce.  
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Thus, this thesis appears to be a timely contribution for clients as well as wealth 
management services providers. 
For clients, adding Corporate Governance Efficiency to their list of criteria to make sure that 
their potential wealth manager will behave in compliance with their best interests is far 
away from being unnecessary. However, none of the four models analyzed is flawless. So, for 
practitioners, being conscious of the strengths and possible flaws of each business model 
regarding corporate governance efficiency it is important to keep in mind because efficiently 
handled, each model attracts the individuals that matched the organization value 
proposition. In a long term perspective, this implies enhanced efficiency that could be 
translated into higher revenues. 
 
8.2 Future research 
As mention earlier, little research has been done in the field of corporate governance in 
private banking. Consequently, finding strong evidence that one model is better than the 
others by just relying on corporate governance efficiency is currently not achievable. In the 
future it may be possible to collect sufficient data to draw a definite conclusion on the best 
business model in private banking and maybe also include more business models.  
Finally, most of the data used in this research are following the post-crisis period. So, even 
though Corporate Governance Efficiency does not appear to be the main criteria clients are 
using to choose their wealth manager, it may be interesting to compare the current results 
with data gathered in period of economic boom to assess whether those results are robust 
to business cycles. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: The Private banking terminology at a glance 
 
- Affluent: A client with investable assets ranging from $100,000 to $500,000.  
 
- Asset under Management (AuM): The level of wealth that a wealth management company is 
currently supervising. Typically, the flow and level of AuM indicates the health and the 
prospects of the institution. 
 
- Family Office: a professional organization set up by wealthy families themselves to manage 
their wealth as well as family matters. A distinction is usually done to differentiate Single Family 
Office (SFO) from Multi-Family Office (MFO). 
 
- High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI): clients with investable assets ranging from $500,000 to 
$50 million. 
 
- Multi-Family Office (MFO): It’s a family office structure set up by more than one family. The 
purpose is to gather the assets of several families to guarantee the access to state-of the art 
investment solutions that require significant upfront investment. 
 
- Private banking: part of the financial industry that deals with clients of at least $100,000 of 
investable assets. High degree of personalization of products and services along with close 
relationship between the bank and the client can distinguish private banking from retail 
banking. 
 
- Private Bankers: it’s a protected designation. In Switzerland, private bankers are entrepreneurs 
with unlimited liability.  
 
- Single Family Office (SFO): It’s a family office structure set up and run by only one family. SFO 
are usually established by wealthy families concerned with privacy. While privacy can be 
guaranteed by the structure, this organization require a large upfront investment in addition 
the costs of running the structure. 
 
- Ultra High Net Worth Individuals (UHNWI): clients with more than $50 million of investable 
assets.  
 
- Wealth Management: term interchangeable with ‘private banking’. The wealth management 
industry deals with clients of at least $100,000 of investable assets. High degree of 
personalization of products and services along with close relationship between the bank and 
the client can distinguish private banking from retail banking. 
 
Source: Author’s research.  
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Appendix II: Name of banks featured in this thesis 
 
Bank’s name 
(in alphabetic order) 
 
Example provided Page(s) 
Barclays Wealth 
 
- Threshold to become a client 
- Graduate programme  
10; 22 
 
Coutts &Co. 
 
- Threshold to become a client 
 
10 
Credit Suisse 
 
-  One of the largest player in the market 
- Graduate programme  
- Outsourcing to third party 
6; 22; 26 
EFG International 
 
- Example of pure player Business model 18 
Goldman Sachs 
 
- Example of integrated bank 16 
HSBC 
 
- Example of integrated bank 16 
Julius Bär 
 
- Training program 
- Example of pure player business model 
28; 38 
Lehman Brother 
 
- Bank’s failure 6 
Lloyds 
 
- Acquisition of private bank 12 
Lombard Odier Private bankers 
 
- Example of pure player business model 18 
Pictet &Cie. 
 
- Example of pure player business model 
- Training program 
18; 28; 38 
RBC Wealth 
 
- Graduate program 22 
UBS 
 
- One of the largest player in the market 
- Example of integrated bank 
6; 16 
Wegelin and Co. 
 
- Oldest Swiss private bank 8; 34 
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Appendix III: Range of products and services available in private banking 
 
Investment and banking services available in 
most private Banks 
 
Non-investment Management services also 
available 
Asset protection planning Assistance in managing and growing collections/ 
Art advisory 
Administration and distribution of investment 
funds 
Bill paying 
Credit Services 
 
Charitable giving 
Derivative instruments 
 
Concierge services 
Estate planning 
 
Financial educational service 
Financial analysis 
 
Luxury acquisition services 
Foreign exchange operations 
 
Managing residences, jets, helicopters and 
yachts 
Investment advisory services 
 
Overseeing emergency and dramatic health-care 
needs 
Investment banking services 
 
Personal/family security-protection services 
Legal and tax advisory services 
 
Property and casualty insurance 
Life insurance 
 
Philanthropic services 
Securities trading, administration and  
safekeeping 
Tax administration services 
Trust services 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Swiss private Banker association website and Prince and Grove 
(2007), Blurring the lines, Private Wealth Magazine.  
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Appendix IV: Bank efficiency and country of origin 
 
 Adjusted 
gross 
margin 
Return 
on 
equity 
Adjusted 
return on 
equity 
Cost/income Total 
revenue 
per 
employee 
Gross 
profit per 
employee 
Average 
AuM per 
employee 
Stakeholder 
income per 
employee 
Overall 
ranking 
Switzerland 
 
4 3 1 7 2 5 1 1 2 
France 
 
2 8 9 8 8 6 8 10 7 
Germany 
 
5 10 10 10 11 10 5 9 11 
Italy 
 
7 7 7 3 9 8 10 5 6 
Liechtenstein 
 
8 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 
United 
Kingdom 
3 2 4 6 5 7 3 7 4 
USA 
 
9 5 5 11 7 11 7 4 7 
Austria 
 
10 9 8 4 10 9 4 6 9 
Benelux 
 
6 6 6 5 4 3 6 3 5 
Japan 
 
11 11 11 9 3 4 9 11 10 
Nordic 
countries 
1 1 3 2 6 2 11 8 3 
 
Source: Birchler et al. (2009), The International Private Banking Study 2009, p.29 
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Appendix V: Overview of the Swiss Private Bankers 
 
Year Name Origin Locations 
(In Switzerland 
and abroad) 
1741 
 
Wegelin & Co. St. Gallen 11 
1750 
 
Rahn & Bodmer Zurich 1 
1780 
 
Landolt & Cie Lausanne 3 
1786 
 
Hottinger & Cie Zurich 13 
1787 
 
LaRoche Banquiers & Co. Basel 4 
1796 
 
Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch Geneva 23 
1805 
 
Pictet & Cie Geneva 21 
1819 
 
Mirabaud & Cie Geneva 9 
1844 
 
Bordier & Cie Geneva 8 
1845 
 
Gonet & Cie Geneva 3 
1886 
 
E. Gutzwiller & Cie Basel 3 
1869 
 
Mourge d’Algue & Cie Geneva 1 
1920 
 
Baumann & Cie Basel 2 
1995 
 
Reichmuth & Co. Lucerne 2 
 
Source: adapted from Cettier and Schmitt (2009), The Rise of Switzerland’s Oldest Bank, p.17 
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Appendix VI: Traditional financial services vs. Family Office approach 
 
Source: Carrol (2001), The function of a Family Office, in McCann and Lavayssière (2008), Wealth, p.113 
  
Characteristics 
 
 
Traditional Financial Services 
Approach 
Family Office Model 
Wealth 
Management 
Methodology 
- Product oriented; 
- Investment-management focused; 
- Advices centered on “in-house” 
portfolio only; 
- Little or no coordination/collaboration 
with third-party providers; 
- Services oriented towards individual 
mid-tier millionaires. 
- Product neutral; 
- Investments are managed in the context of the 
family ”balance sheet”; 
- Advice reflects a full view of client’s assets; 
- Coordinates/collaborate with all providers to 
develop an integrated wealth strategy; 
- Service focuses on the mid-tier millionaire family 
“entity”. 
 
Product & 
Pricing 
 
- Transaction-based pricing now moving 
towards asset under management or 
“by service” fee-based model; 
- Ad-hoc investment process; reacts to 
market conditions; 
- Portfolio reviews based on standard 
templates. 
 
- Historically AuM-based pricing; 
- Investment process is often documented and 
standardized, according to agreed-upon 
investment policy; 
- Portfolio reviews are regularly scheduled and 
customized according to client’s needs and 
preferences. 
Products & 
Services 
 
- Advice & Planning to develop 
personalized wealth management 
plan: 
Set objectives; 
Develop strategy; 
Implement solutions; 
Review progress. 
- Banking services: 
Direct deposit, check writing, funds 
transfer, etc. 
- Business Financial services:  
Integrated cash management, business 
banking, etc. 
- Credit & Lending: 
Home, personal, investment and 
business financing. 
- Estate Planning: 
Trust services, tax assessments, etc. 
- Investment Management; 
- Retirement Planning. 
 
- Chief Advisor: Oversees relationships with all 
product and service providers, external 
counselors/advisors; provides personalized 
service, technical expertise and creative 
business leadership; 
- Investment manager: Manages, analyzes and 
review family’s financial capital, including 
investment policy, manager selection/review, 
asset monitoring/review and due diligence; 
- Financial administrator: Ensures asset 
allocation mirrors client’s investment 
philosophy, tax compliance, financial control, 
project management, and financial reporting; 
- Trustee: Educates and mentors: administers 
family trusts, ensure timely communications 
and oversees philanthropic management; 
- Back Office Manager: Provides investment and 
partnership accounting, client reporting, 
internal controls and technology support. 
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Appendix VII: The CIO Background in Single Family Offices 
 
Source: Amit et al. (2008), Single family office: private wealth management in the family context, p.21 
 
 
Appendix VIII: Conditions to be eligible to the “private banker” designation 
 
To be eligible to the designation”private banker”, Swiss private banks need to meet the 
following criteria: 
 
 It is entered in the trade register as banker or bank of sole ownership, general partnership, 
limited partnership or limited partnership with shares, i.e. any private bank with at least one 
partner who has unlimited liability ; 
 
 That the partner with unlimited liability is - or that the majority of partners are – a Swiss 
citizen(s). Where an institution has two partners with unlimited liability, only one need be a 
Swiss national ; 
 
 That one of the partners with unlimited liability has been a member of the Swiss Bankers 
Association for at least three years.  
 
 
 
Source: Swiss Private Banker Association website 
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Appendix IX: Best global private banks over the last 3 years (Euromoney) 
 
Private Bank Rank 2010 Rank  2009 Rank 2008 
Credit Suisse 1 4 4 
HSBC 2 2 3 
UBS 3 1 1 
Citi 4 3 2 
JP Morgan 5 5 6 
BNP Paribas 6 6 9 
Julius Baer 7 13 13 
Deutsche Bank 8 7 5 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 8 8 7 
Pictet 10 9 11 
Barclays 11 11 27 
Santander 12 12 14 
RBC 13 24 23 
Société Générale 14 14 12 
Goldman Sachs 15 10 8 
ABN Amro 16 15 10 
Nordea 17 18 - 
BBVA 18 30 - 
Danske bank 19 25 30 
UniCredit 20 16 - 
Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch 21 23 17 
ING 22 22 19 
SEB 23 32 - 
Itaú Private Bank 24 29 - 
China Merchants Bank 25 - - 
 
 
Source: Euromoney, Private Banking surveys 2009 and 2010 
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Appendix X: Best net-worth services over the past 3 years (Euromoney) 
 
Super affluent ($500,000 to $1 million) 
Bank Rank 2010 Rank  2009 Rank 2008 
HSBC 1 1 4 
Citi 2 2 6 
UBS 3 3 1 
BNP Paribas 4 5 9 
BofA Merrill Lynch 5 4 3 
Credit Suisse 6 6 2 
Deutsche Bank 7 7 7 
Santander 8 10 8 
Barclays 8 8 19 
ABN Amro 10 9 5 
 
High net Worth I ($1 million to $10 million)                       High Net Worth II ($10 million to $30 million) 
Bank  2010   2009  2008 
HSBC 1 2 3 
UBS 2 1 1 
Credit Suisse 3 4 2 
Citi 4 3 5 
Deutsche Bank 5 6 6 
BofA Merrill Lynch 6 5 4 
BNP Paribas 7 7 7 
ABN Amro 8 13 - 
Santander 8 14 - 
JP Morgan 10 11 - 
 
 
Ultra High Net Worth (Greater than $30 million) 
Bank Rank 2010 Rank  2009 Rank 2008 
JP Morgan 1 3 5 
Goldman Sachs 2 2 2 
UBS 3 1 1 
Credit Suisse 4 6 4 
HSBC 5 4 8 
Citi 6 5 3 
Pictet 7 8 9 
Deutsche Bank 8 7 10 
Rothschild 8 11 - 
BNP Paribas 10 10 11 
 
Source: Euromoney, Private Banking surveys 2009 and 2010 
Bank  2010   2009  2008 
UBS 1 1 1 
JP Morgan 2 2 4 
Credit Suisse 3 5 3 
HSBC 4 3 6 
Citi 5 4 2 
Goldman Sachs 6 6 5 
Deutsche Bank 7 8 8 
Pictet 8 9 9 
BofA Merrill Lynch 8 7 7 
BNP Paribas 10 10 10 
